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The research related to the association between structure ownership and the firm 
value is a discussion about corporate governance which is still has contradictory 
conclusion and mixed result. It indicates open question that needs empirical 
evidence. The influence of concentrated ownership on firm value still brought 
conflict of interest so the role of analyst following can be stated as an alternative of 
corporate governance mechanism (Lang et al., 2004). The objectives of this research 
are to examine the interaction effect between concentrated ownership and analyst 
following, and the effect of investor protection toward firm value in five Asian 
companies. Asia is chosen because it has unique characteristic, in term of corporates 
ownership structure which is more concentrated on families and board of governance 
is weak (Choi, 2003). The data is consisting of 7.100 firm year observations obtained 
from Bloomberg and OSIRIS database for the period 2011-2013 in five Asian 
Countries, i.e. China, South Korea,  Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand. Multiple 
Regression analysis is used to test hypotheses. The results show that concentrated 
ownership is positively affects the firm value. However, there is no empirical 
evidence that the interaction of concentrated ownership and analyst following 
positively affect the firm value. As hypothesized, this research also shows that 
investor protection has negative impact on firm’s value.
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INTRODUCTION 
The research that is related to the association 
between ownership structure and firm perfor-
mance is a discussion that still raises conflict bet-
ween managers and owners of companies or 
shareholders. Several previous research results 
show a contradictory conclusion about the asso-
ciation between ownership structure and firm 
performance. Shleifer and Vishney (1986) used 
sample of 456 companies, stating that concen-
trated ownership positively affects the firm perfor-
mance. Shah and Hussain (2012) used a sample of 
61 non-financial firms listed on the Karachi Stock 
Exchange to examine the effect of ownership 
structure and concentrated ownership structure on 
firm value. However, the results of the research 
indicate that the ownership is concentrated on the 
managerial, which means that the increasing share 
portion owned by the managerial party has an 
impact on the negative relationship with firm value 
while concentrated ownership shows insignificant 
influence. 
This positive impact can be explained that 
the majority owners or blockholders have the 
power to supervise the managers in running the 
firm’s operations for the benefit of the share-
holders. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) provide 
evidence that concentrated ownership is positively 
related to potential supervisory activities perfor-
med by the owners of capital. The higher the 
share ownership, the supervision of the majority 
shareholder will also be higher, so the value of the 
company will also increase (Smith, 1996). 
Fama and Jensen (1983), and Pedersen and 
Thomsen (1997, 1999) state otherwise that 
concentrated ownership negatively affects firm 
performance. Lemmon and Lins (2003) con-
ducted a research using a sample of 800 firms in 
the emerging markets in eight East Asian 
countries. The results stated that concentrated 
ownership had a negative effect on the firm value. 
La Porta, 2000 describes that this negative impact 
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is because of the likelihood that the majority 
owners of controlling shareholders are strongly 
motivated to make "unfair" transacttions to divert 
company resources to increase their own 
prosperity. The information asymmetry approach 
is a way to reduce the imbalance of information 
disclosure in capital markets between internal and 
external parties (Shah and Hussain, 2012). The 
results of analytical activity in the form of analyst 
following are expected to reduce the imbalance of 
information disclosure in the capital market 
between internal and external parties. 
Financial analysts can play a role in reducing 
agency costs that arised because of the separation 
of ownership and supervision called security 
analysts. The analysts play a role through two 
mechanisms, as a monitor and as an information 
mediator (Cheng and Subramayam, 2008). 
Analysts as the monitor have the sense that they 
supervise the actions of managers and publish the 
manager activities. The second role of analysts is 
that as a firm information intermediary has the 
sense that the analyst as a bridge of information 
between internal and external firms to reduce the 
risk of information asymmetry. McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) documented empirical evidence 
that analyst following have a positive effect on the 
firm value. The analysts have the potential to 
improve the quality of information and therefore it 
is able to reduce the uncertainty, reduce the risk 
of information asymmetry, and is expected to 
increase the market value. 
Lang et al. (2003) states that the greatest 
supervision rights are in the family or governance 
group (the largest blockholders), resulting in a 
decreasing number of analysts following. The 
analysts are less interested in firms with poor firm-
level corporate governance, such as concentrated 
ownership. This is further reinforced if the firm is 
domiciled in a country with law protection against 
low investors, so the role of analysts is more 
effective in countries with advanced capital 
markets and high investor protection. 
This research examines the interaction 
between analyst following and the concentrated 
ownership structure to the firm value. Analyst 
following has a positive effect on the firm value 
which means that although the company has a 
high concentrated ownership but the analysts 
continue to analyze the firm and therefore it will 
give a positive impact on the value of the firm. 
This provides benefits to the investors and thus 
affects their decisions. 
Highly concentrated ownership has conse-
quences of minority shareholders. The need for 
investor protection will be higher if there is a 
minority shareholder (Boubaker and Labegorre, 
2008). The protection of minority investors is 
weaker if the investor's ability to supervise the 
governance is weak. The role of analysts as moni-
toring and information intermediaries can provide 
protection especially information protection and 
therefore it is expected to reduce the information 
gap to minority shareholders. This indicates that 
the role of analysts will increase, especially in 
countries with low investor protection (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1996). 
Analyst following can give a positive impact 
for firms with low governance. Firms that have low 
governance but has more number of analysts who 
examine the firm will have a positive impact on 
firm value (Yu, 2009). Lang and Lundholm (1996) 
state that with the role of analyst following can 
increase the investor knowledge, reduce infor-
mation asymmetric risk, and reduce capital costs. 
This research examines the impact of interaction 
between concentrated ownership and analyst 
following to the firm value. 
This research is different from Lang et al. 
(2004) and Chang et al. (2000), which show that 
(1) the sample selection are from firms in five
Asian countries and firm sample of each country
are in larger quantities, so it is expected to reflect
more on the condition of the country, (2) in
general, the capital market in Asia is the emerging
capital market and therefore the information
environment is different from the developed
capital market.
The analysts have incentives to be active in 
conductiong its function as independent super-
visors which can only be tested in common law 
countries with strong investor protection (Barniv et 
al., 2005). In connection with this statement, the 
question arises on how are the role of the analysts 
if testing is conducted in the code law country with 
low investor protection and a little hindrance for 
the internal firms to exploit the firms' wealth. 
Further motivation as far as the best knowledge of 
the researcher, there is still little literature that 
discusses the relationship between the firm value 
and analyst following on different spheres of 
governance and law enforcement. One of the 
reasons is that the limited data related to analyst 
following in emerging market. This research is 
expected to attract the attention of the analysts to 
analyze the firm's financial data in emerging 
market. The choice of Asian firms as research 
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samples is because most Asian firms have a 
concentrated ownership structure, which have the 
potential to experience greater agency issues 
related to governance, and tends to be a country 
with low investor protection. 
Based on the background explained, this 
research specifically aims to test: (1) the influence 
of concentrated ownership and firm value, (2) the 
interaction between analyst following with 
ownership structure to the firm value, and (3) the 
influence of investor protection to the firm value. 
This research contributes to three important 
things: (1) deeper understanding of the effect of 
concentrated ownership on the firm value and 
how the interaction effects between the concen-
trated ownership structure with the analyst 
following to the firm value; (2) strengthening the 
literature on the role of analysts in balancing 
information between internal and external parties 
of the firms, especially the emerging capital 
markets in the Asian region; and (3) strengthening 
the argument that the investor protection envi-
ronment plays a role in determining the firm 
value. The researcher expect that the role of the 
analysts would be more effective as an inde-
pendent monitor (Healy and Palepu, 2003) since 
the recommendations given are more useful to the 
investors if there is an analyst following in a firn 
with low corporate governance and located in a 
country with low investor protection. 
This research consists of 5 sections. Section 2 
in this research contains of literature review and 
hypothesis development. Section 3 describes the 
research design, which consists of sample 
selection, operational definitions of variables and 
statistical testing tools used. Section 4 describes 
the results of the research and section 5 presents 
the conclusions and limitations of the study. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND   
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Agency Theory 
The Agency Theory is presented by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) who state that the perception 
of governance relationship as a contract between 
the principal and the director. Both relationships 
are assumed that both parties are utility maxi-
mizers so it is reasonable to say that agents do not 
always act on the best interest principal. Agency 
theory states that the two parties that do contract 
are in the condition of information asymmetry 
because the agent has more information about the 
firm than the owner of the capital. This can lead 
to a conflict of interest between the two parties 
with the assumption of underlying the theory that 
each individual will act in order to maximize their 
own interests. 
Corporate Governance Theory (CGT) 
CGT is presented as the underlying theory of 
researches that discuss ownership structures and 
the relationship between capital owners and 
agents. Giilian (2006) classifies corporate gover-
nance into two groups, namely internal corporate 
governance and external corporate governance. 
Gillian divides internal corporate governance into 
5 basic categories: 1) The Board of Directors (2) 
Managerial Incentives, 3) Capital Structure, 4) 
Bylaw and Charter Provisions, and 5) Internal 
Control System. Corporate Governance Mecha-
nism in the form of information about the board 
of directors is the most accessible information by 
investors. 
Claessens et al. (2000) explains that most 
companies in East Asia have a concentrated 
ownership structure with supervision and control 
lying in that majority group. Firms in Asian 
countries have lower internal governance levels 
such as lower board independence and relatively 
have incomplete committees. Most countries in 
Asia that are in a state of weak legal system and 
protection of weak investors is called code law. 
Countries that are included in the category of code 
law groups are China and South Korea. Countries 
with common law legal systems have strong 
investor protection (La Porta et al., 1998). Com-
pared to countries in Southeast Asia, East Asian 
countries such as China, Japan, Hong Kong, and 
Korea have more developed economies. The 
advanced economic conditions and market condi-
tions have led to the creation of strong investor 
protection. However, there are some countries in 
Southeast Asia that belong to the Common Law 
group of countries, such as Taiwan, Malaysia, and 
Thailand. 
Ownership structure is one of the dimensions 
of corporate governance that is believed to affect 
the performance of the firm in which also affects 
the relationship between the owners of capital with 
agents. High concentrated ownership structures 
have the potential to raise the agency issues and 
tend to manipulate the information because there 
is an increased intervention from the majority 
shareholder. A control which is mostly held by a 
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few parties can lead to higher agency problems, 
while Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand are com-
mon law countries with low investor protection. 
 
Concentrated Ownership Structure and  
Firm Value 
  
The results of research related to the relation-
ship between the concentrated ownership struc-
tures with the firm value is still contradictory. The 
result of testing the relationship between the 
concentrated ownership structure and firm value is 
not yet conclusive in which there are two contra-
dictory conclusions and therefore further empi-
rical testing is required. Some researches show 
that there is no monotonous relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance 
(Morck et al., 1988). In contrast, La Porta (2000) 
states that there is a negative influence between the 
concentrated ownership structure and the firm 
value. This negative impact is due to the possibility 
that the majority owners of controlling share-
holders are strongly motivated to make "unfair" 
transactions to divert the firm resources to 
increase their own prosperity. 
Increasingly concentrated ownership can im-
prove a firm’s supervision function. If the share-
holder of a firm is owned by a small portion of the 
party, it can create a self-monitoring function to 
enhance the managerial accountability (Coffee, 
1991). Shleifer and Vishney (1986) also argue that 
increasingly shareholdings ownership can enhance 
the ability of its shareholders to monitor and 
influence the management more precisely in 
protecting its business activities. The higher the 
share ownership, the supervision of the majority 
shareholder will also be higher and therefore the 
value of the company will also increase (Smith, 
1996). 
In addition, the difference in the results can 
also be caused by the manager's role who do not 
consider the personal interest but the interests of 
shareholders and managers that can be aligned 
through the achievement of the organizational 
goals. If there is a difference of interest between 
the principal and the agent, then the agent will 
uphold the value of togetherness so that the 
corporate goals can be realized. This is suitable 
with the stewardship theory. In other words, 
Stewardship theory views management as a trust-
worthy to act at its best to realize the corporate 
interests such as enhancing corporate value 
(Donaldson and Davis 1989). 
The testing of the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm value is still an issue 
that requires empirical testing, so the research is 
motivated to continue testing the relationship 
between concentrated ownership and firm value 
with a sample of firms in five Asian countries. The 
researcher conducted the study based on the 
explained argument. The first hypothesis in this 
study is as follows: 
H1: The concentrated ownership structure posi-
tively affects the firm value 
 
The Relationship between Ownership Structure, 
Analyst Following, and Firm Value 
 
Fan and Wong (2002) and Willekens et al. 
(2005) mention several reasons why good 
corporate governance qualities have an impact on 
analyst following, i.e. (1) analysts tend to choose 
firm characteristics that reveal more information 
in both financial and non-finance. This can lower 
the costs for analysts to dig and collect infor-
mation; (2) firms that have good corporate gover-
nance mechanisms will be able to directly monitor 
the manager behavior, related to interests between 
managers and shareholders due to the separation 
of ownership, thereby reducing agency issues; (3) 
analysts prefer firms that have good governance 
mechanisms with better management perceptions 
that expect less effort to be made. 
The testing results Lang et al. (2004) stated 
that analyst following is positively related to the 
firm value, especially the firms that have the 
potential to manipulate information and have 
poor corporate governance. The testing results of 
Yu (2009), Lang and Lundholm (1996) stated that 
the role of analyst following can increase the 
investor's knowledge, reduce asymmetric informa-
tion risk and reduce capital cost. The researcher 
expects the interaction coefficient will be positive, 
which means to strengthen the relationship bet-
ween concentrated ownership and firm value. 
Based on the argument explained, the second 
hypothesis in this study is as follows: 
H2:  The positive influence of concentrated owner-
ship structure to the firm value will be greater 
if the firm is followed by more analyst 
following. 
 
The Relationship between Investor Protection and 
Firm Value 
 
According to Chang et al. (2000), corporate 
governance mechanisms can be classified into two 
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categories, namely (1) country-specific governance 
mechanisms such as investor protection, rule of 
law, and supervision by the capital market; (2) 
firm-specific internal mechanisms such as owner-
ship structure, managerial incentive, and auditor 
selection. 
The research results of La porta et al. (1998) 
suggests that governance at the corporate and 
governance levels at the country level tends to 
move together. Firms that have concentrated 
ownership (corporate level), tend to occur in 
countries with low investor protection (country 
level). This has an impact on the presence of 
centralized supervision. Gul and Qui (2002) argue 
that concentrated ownership tend to occur in 
countries with low investor protection. Internal 
parties of a firm have a tendency to influence the 
information and transactions, such as insider 
trading which, if unrestricted, will less consider the 
protection of minority shareholders’ interests (La 
Porta, 1998). The investor protection is one of the 
external governance mechanisms at the country 
level. 
There are still two different opinions 
regarding the influence of the firm domicile 
country (whether domiciled in the country with 
high investor protection or low investor protect-
tion) towards the contradictory firm values. The 
first opinion of La Porta et al. (1998) explains that 
in countries with low investor protection tend to 
have concentrated ownership so that blockholders 
have the ability to monitor agency activities and 
benefit from those controls. This phenomenon is 
defined as the cost-efficiency of monitoring by 
blockholders can increase the value of the 
company. 
The second opinion states that concentrated 
share ownership tends to occur in countries with 
low investor protection. Claessens et al. (2002) 
report that firms in developing countries are 
dominated by concentrated ownership or assets 
resulting in conglomerations that incur high 
agency costs (Berger and Ofek 1995). Inefficient 
resource allocation (asset allocation to sustain 
survival) has an impact on declining firm values 
(Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Mansi and Reeb 
(2002). 
Firms with a dispersed ownership structure 
are not much involved in their business activities 
because the dispersed ownership structure 
requires firms to be more open in every business 
activity. The distribution of share ownership tends 
to occur in countries with high investor protection 
(Leuz et al., 2003). 
This research examines on how the relation-
ship between the two mechanism groups of corpo-
rate governance with concentrated ownership 
(corporate level) with investor protection at the 
country level, that is testing whether the firm value 
that tend to have a concentrated ownership struc-
ture is influenced by the environment of investor 
protection of the domicile country of the com-
pany. Based on those arguments, the second 
hypothesis in this study is as follows: 
H3:  The firm value will increase in firms that are 
domiciled in countries with low investor 
protection. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Data and Sample 
 
This research used Bloomberg and Bvd 
Osiris database as a source of firm financial data. 
The type of data used in this research is secondary 
data. The use of this database is chosen because it 
can meet the data requirements used for testing 
and other database access limitations. The 
observation year is planned in 2011-2013. These 
years were chosen because those are the year with 
the latest data update, and the firms in sample 
countries expected in this research are 
manufacturing firms in Asia consisting of China, 
Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
The selection of Asian firms as research samples 
is because most Asian firms have a concentrated 
ownership structure that have the potential for 
agency problems, more governance problems, and 
tend to be a country with low investor protection. 
 
Variable Measurement 
 
Variables measurement of this study are 
detailed in Table 1. 
 
Statistics Testing 
 
The concentrated ownership relationship, 
analyst following, and firm value, used the 
modified Multiple Regression statistics testing 
from Lang et al. (2004) that follows the Lang and 
Lundholm models, (1996) and Lang et al. (2003). 
Here is the regression equation to test hypotheses 
1, 2, and 3: 
 
Tobin’s Qit = β0 + β1OWNCONit + β2ANFOLLit + β3OWNCON*ANFOLL + β4INVPit  
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+ β5SIZEit + β6XLISTit + β7LEVERAGEit + β8CAPEXit + β9EASURPit + ε 
Information : 
OWNCON = the proportion of the number of 
shares owned by the three largest share-
holders in a firm i in year t (La Porta, 
1998). 
ANFOLL = the number of analysts who 
forecast annual earnings of firm i in year 
t, listed in Bloomberg database. 
INVP = the number of five dimensions of 
investor protection measurement pub-
lished by world economic forums. 
SIZE = total natural logarithm of firm asset i in 
year t. 
XLIST = dummy variable1 if the company 
listings in the U.S Market and performs 
a financial statement reconciliation 
pursuant to U.S. GAAP, 0 otherwise, in 
company i in year t. 
LEV = ratio of firm total to asset total of firm i 
in year t. 
CAPEX = ratio of capital expenditures to total 
assets of firm i in year t. 
EASURP = the value of absolute, the 
difference in earnings per recent share 
with profit per share of the previous year 
divided to share price of company i in 
year t. ε =     standard error. 
 
Additional Testing 
 
The research that is related to the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance divides this relationship into 2 types, 
namely: linear and non-linear. Pedersen and 
Thomsen (1999) conducted testing using the 
assumption that there is a linear relationship 
between the concentrated ownership structure to  
 
Table 1. Variables measurement 
Variable Measurement 
Firm Value The Firm Value that is proxied with Tobin’s Q, measured by: (Market Cap + Liabilities + 
Preferred Equity + Minority Interest) / Total Assets. 
Concentraded 
ownership 
The concentrated ownership structure is measured with the proportion of the number of 
shares owned by the five largest shareholders in a company's largest shareholder in a 
company (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Nevertheless, not all shareholdings reach the five 
largest owners. 
Analyts Following Analyst following is measured by the number of analysts who publish annual earnings 
forecasts. 
Investor Protection The investor protection variable is measured with the investor protection index published 
by the World Economic Forum that includes five dimensions: board independence, 
enforcement of securities laws, protection of minority shareholder rights, enforcement of 
accounting and auditing standards, and judicial independence . The value of investor 
protection is the sum of the five dimensions (Houqe et al., 2012). This research 
categorizes the level of investor protection into two, namely high and low level of investor 
protection. The determination of high and low investor protection level is based on 
median value, country which has investor protection value higher than median value is 
categorized as country with high investor protection and vice versa. This research used the 
median value instead of the average value because the median value is not affected by 
investor protection values that is too high or too low, whereas the average value is usually 
greatly affected if there is value of investor protection which is too extreme. 
Control Variables Control variables used are: SIZE sign that is expected positive, XLIST sign that is 
expected positive, CAPEX affects positively with the firm value. This research used 
control variable according to research of McConnell and Sarvaes (1995) which states that 
LEV have negative effect to the firm value. McConnell and Muscarella (1985) state that the 
increase in capital expenditure has been responded positively to investors and therefore it 
raises the value of shares. CAPEX has a positive effect on stock price volatility (Coles et 
al., 2004). The other control variables related to the analyst following that are used 
according to Lang and Lundholm (1996) research are EARNING SURPRISE which 
negatively affects the analyst following. Lang and Lundholm (1996) state that the variable 
earnings surprise is a deviation of expected earnings per share substation so that the analyst 
must make a significant revision on the forecast. 
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the firm performance. In contrast, Morck et al. 
(1988)  and  McConnell  and  Servaes (1990) used  
testing model with the assumption of non-linear  
which is show that there is a non-linear rela-
tionship between managerial  ownership  and firm 
performance. The testing of linear or nonlinear 
relationship between concentrated ownership and 
firm performance can be seen from the impact of 
alignment and entrenchment effect. 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) divide the agency 
costs into two types, namely: type I and type II. 
Type I occurs because there is a separation 
between the owner and the manager of the firm 
and the owners are not actively involved in mana-
ging the firm. The agents have the opportunity to 
not always act on the best interests of shareholders 
which is called managerial opportunism. Type II 
occurs when the owners are so dominant and 
become predators for the minority owners. This 
concentrated ownership creates owner opportu-
nism when great control over transactions lies in 
their hands and can act more favorably to them-
selves (Morck et al., 1988). Type II is called 
entrenchment effect. 
This research will test on the concentrated 
ownership level of how much, entrenchment 
effects tend to occur. Fama and Jensen (1983) 
state that if managerial ownership reaches more 
than 50%, then there is full supervision. If there is 
full supervision, the majority may interfere with 
business activities and tend not to consider 
minorities. This research will test the various levels 
of concentrated ownership toward changes in 
Tobin's Q value. 
Based on the alignment argument, the higher 
concentrated ownership will improve the perfor-
mance of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
while the argument entrenchment suggests that 
higher concentrated ownership will have a detri-
mental effect on firm performance (Morck et al., 
1988). 
 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
The data were obtained from Bloomberg and 
Bvd Osiris database with observation years from 
2011-2013. Table 2 illustrates the sample used in 
this research, such as manufacturing firms from 
five Asian countries consisting China, South 
Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and Taiwan. The 
number of observations from China was 2,997 or 
42.2% of all data, South Korea as many as 1,801 
or 25.4% of all data, Taiwan as many as 1,337 or 
18.8%, Malaysia 773 or 10.9% and the least 
observation is Thailand with as many as 192 firms 
or 2.7% of the total observations in this research. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics can be used to view the 
deployment of the data to its central value (mean).  
 
Table 2. Sample Selection by Country 
Country  
Year Observation 
Number of Observation % 
2011 2012 2013 
China 975 1.115 907 2.997 42,2 
South Korea 606 592 603 1.801 25,4 
Taiwan 466 449 422 1,337 18,8 
Malaysia 263 260 250 773 10,9 
Thailand 68 59 65 192 2,7 
Total 2.378 2.475 2.247 7.100 100 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Min Max Mean Median Std.Dev 
Tobin’Q 0,2625 3,7106 1,2019 1,1323 0,4140 
OWNCON 0,16 99,63 46,2476 46,5100 19,855 
ANFOLL 0 47 2,64 1.00 5,554 
INVP 19 26,30 22,2559 21,300 2,3494 
SIZE_LN 1,8573 12,8311 6,5653 6,5869 1,9049 
LEV 0,0075 1,5613 0,4317 0,4360 0,198 
CAPEX -1,977 -0,000 -0,073 -0,031 1,672 
EASURP 0,0001 32,955 0,5621 0,1557 1,8843 
XLIST 0 N = 7.092    
 1 N =         8    
Total  7.100 
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One of the indicators of data dissemination can be 
seen in the standard deviation value. The lower 
the standard deviation value indicates that the data 
tends to have a value close to the average value of 
the data (see Table 3). 
 
Hypothesis Testing One: Effect of Ownership 
Concentration on Firm Value 
 
Before doing the regression for testing the 
two hypotheses, the researcher conducted the 
classical assumptions testing
1
. Based on the clas-
sical assumption testing that has been performed 
and the calculation results, it shows that all the 
requirements have been fulfilled and therefore 
this reseach meet all the requirements of classical 
assumptions. The testing results of each classical 
assumption showed that the regression model did 
not experience multicollinearity, heteroscedas-
ticity, autocorrelation, with normal distributing of 
standard error. 
The first hypothesis (H1) states that the 
concentrated ownership structure positively affects 
the firm value. This hypothesis leads to firms that 
have a higher concentrated ownership structure 
that the higher the firm value. Table 4 shows the 
results of hypothesis testing. The testing results 
show that the concentrated ownership structure 
has a significant positive effect on firm value, 
significant at p-value value 0.00 (<0.01). Based on 
the testing results, the hypothesis one in this 
research which states that firms that have a higher 
concentrated owenership, have an effect on the 
firm value which is also supported. 
These results support the opinion of Shleifer 
and Vishney (1986) who argue that an increasingly 
larger shareholding can increase the ability of its 
shareholders to monitor and influence the mana-
gement more precisely in protecting its business 
activities. The higher the share ownership, the 
supervision of the majority shareholder will also 
                                                          
1
Normality test was performed with Kolmogorov Smirnov 
test and normal probability plot of standardized residual 
Asymp. Sig. of 0.086. Multicollinearity testing is to test 
the correlation between independent variables as 
measured by Variance Inflanattion factor (VIF), and VIF 
value for all variables no more than 10. Heterosce-
dasticity test using Glejser test with Prob value. Chi-
Square of 1,000. Autocorrelation test to ensure no 
correlation between variables by using Durbin-Watson 
test, with Durbin-Watson (DW) is 1.976. 
be higher, so the value of the company will also 
increase (Smith, 1996). 
Based on the testing results of all control 
variables, they show the appropriate direction 
except Xlist variable. The Xlist variable shows this 
unsuitable direction because of the average of 
firms listed in the New York Stock Exchange and 
reconciling financial statements in accordance with 
US. GAAP is less than those that are listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange but do not reconcile 
with US. GAAP. 
 
Table 4. Results of Hypothesis Testing 1, 2, and 3 
Independent Variable 
Expected  
Sign 
Coefficient 
(P-value) 
Constant  1,074 
OWNCON + 0,001 
(0,000) 
ANFOLL + 0,006 
(0,000) 
OWNCON*ANFOLL + 0,00001 
(0,700) 
INVP - -0,016 
(0,000)* 
SIZE_LN + 0,100 
(0,000)* 
LEV - -0,645 
(0,000)* 
CAPEX - -0,748 
(0,000*) 
EASURP - -0,035 
(0,000)* 
XLIST 
+ 
-0,628 
(0,000)* 
R
2
 
Adjusted R
2
 
Total Observation 
 
0,400 
0,399 
7100 
Tobin’s Qit  = β0 + β1OWNCONit + β2ANFOLLit + β3 
OWNCON*ANFOLL + β4INVPit + β5SIZEit + β6XLISTit + β7LEVERAGEit + β8CAPEXit + β9EASURPit + ε 
*   significant at level 1%  ** significant at level 5% 
 
The Results of Hypothesis Testing Two: Analyst 
Following as Moderate relationship between 
Concentrated Ownership and Value Company 
 
Hypothesis two states that the relationship 
between the concentrated ownership structure and 
the firm value gets stronger if the firm is followed 
by more analyst following. This leads to if the 
company has a highly concentrated ownership 
structure and analysts continue to analyze the firm, 
then the firm value will be higher. The influence 
of moderation of analyst following is done by 
testing the interaction between variable ownership 
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concentration and analyst following. Related to 
that, the coefficient of regression result for the 
interaction variable (OWNCON * ANFOLL) is 
expected to be positive.  
Table 4 shows that the coefficient of interac-
tion between concentrated ownership with analyst 
following is not significant (0,700> 0,05). The 
results of this test indicate that analyst following is 
not a moderator of influence of concentration of 
ownership on firm value. Thus, the third hypo-
thesis proposed in this research is not supported. 
However, the significant ANFOLL coefficient 
(0.006) implies that the analyst following variable 
is an independent variable that positively affects 
the firm value. Mouselli and Hussainey (2009) 
conducting firm testing that is listed in the London 
Stock Exchange stating that better corporate 
governance quality and more analytical amounts 
do not have a significant impact on raising 
corporate value. This gives an idea of the increase 
in corporate value is influenced by other factors. 
 
Result of Hypothesis Testing Three: The 
Environmental Effects of Investor Protection to 
Firm Value 
 
Hypotheses three that will be tested in this 
research is the effect of the investor protection 
environment to the firm value. Hypothesis three is 
said to be supported if the coefficient of the 
Investor Protection (INVP) variable is negatively 
significant. Table 4 shows the testing results that 
the Investor Protection (INVP) variable coefficient 
is significantly negative at p-value 0,000 (<0.01). 
The results of this testing support the proposed 
hypothesis. 
Highly concentrated ownership has conse-
quences of minority shareholders. The need for 
investor protection will be higher if there is a 
minority shareholder (Boubaker and Labegorre, 
2008). The protection of minority investors is 
weakened if the investor's ability to supervise the 
management is weak. La Porta et al. (1998) 
explains that in countries with low investor 
protection tends to have concentrated ownership, 
so that blockholders have the ability to monitor 
agency activities and benefit from those controls.  
to firm value show different results. Morck et al. 
(1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990). This 
phenomenon is said that the cost-efficiency of 
monitoring by blockholders can increase the firm 
value. 
 
Additional Testing  
 
The additional testing in this research was 
conducted to examine how the effect of various 
levels of ownership is  concentrated  on changes in 
 
Table 5. Regression Test Per Share Ownership Group 
Independent Variable  
Expected  
Sign 
Coefficient of 
Group Share 
Ownership 0-20%  
Coefficient of Group 
Share Ownership  
20-65% 
Coefficient of 
Group Share 
Ownership > 65% 
 (P-Value)  (P-Value)  (P-Value) 
Constant  1,555 
(0,000)* 
0,959 
(0,000)* 
1,374 
(0,000)* 
OWNCON + 0,002 
(0,268) 
0,002 
(0,000)* 
-0,001 
(0,652) 
INVP + -0,003 
(0,000)* 
-0,003 
(0,000)* 
-0,021 
(0,000)* 
SIZE_LN + 0,043 
(0,000)* 
0,043 
(0,000*) 
0,109 
(0,000)* 
LEV - -0,339 
(0,000)* 
-0,339 
(0,000)* 
-0,870 
(0,000)* 
CAPEX - -1,356 
(0,000)* 
-1,356 
(0,000)* 
-0,622 
(0,000)* 
EASURP - -0,046 
(0,002)* 
-0,046 
(0,002)* 
-0,032 
(0,000)* 
XLIST + -0,715 
(0,000)* 
-0,715 
(0,000)* 
 
R
2
 
Adjusted R
2
 
Jumlah Observasi 
 0,411 
0,405 
805 
0,392 
0,391 
4954 
0,387 
0,384 
1.341 
* significant at level 1%, ** significant at level 5% 
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the value of Tobin's Q. Testing related to the 
relationship of concentrated ownership structure 
conducted testing using non-linear assumptions. 
Testing of linear or non-linear relationships bet-
ween concentrated ownership and firm perfor-
mance can be viewed in terms of the impact of 
alignment and entrenchment effect. Based on the 
argument, this research will examine the non-
linear relationship between the concentrated 
ownership structure and the firm value. The 
grouping of the data is based on the characteristics 
of the sample, i.e. the percentage level of 
concentrated ownership. Since hypothesis two is 
not supported, this additional testing does not 
include the analyst following as a moderating 
variable. Regression test for all three groups can 
be seen in Table 5
2
. 
Based on the result of share ownership group 
testing as much as 0-20%, concentrated ownership 
variable has positive coefficient value with Asymp 
sig value. 0.268> 0.005 which means the influence 
of concentrated ownership on firm value is insigni-
ficant. The two-group regression testing shows that 
the concentrated ownership has a positive 
coefficient value with the Asymp.sig value. 0,000 
<0.005 which means the influence of ownership is 
concentrated on significant firm value. If it is 
compared with the result of regression of group 
one which if 0-20% share ownership does not 
significantly affect the firm value, but if share 
ownership more than 20-65% have significant 
effect to the firm value. 20-65% ownership testing 
results provide evidence that alignment effects 
tend to occur. This is in line with the alignment 
argument which states that the higher concentrated 
ownership will improve the firm performance 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The result of regression test of group three is 
that share ownership more than 65% indicates that 
the ownership is not significant (p-value = 0,652> 
0,005). This result does not support Fama and 
Jensen (1983) who state that if managerial owner-
ship reaches more than 50% then there is full 
supervision and shareholders tend to take actions 
that benefit their own interests. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
All variables show appropriate sign except Xlist. This 
incompatible direction is due to the small sample of 
companies listed on NewYork Sock Exchange. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The first objective of this research is to 
examine whether the concentrated ownership 
structure has a positive effect on the firm value. 
The empirical test results provide evidence that 
the concentrated ownership structure has a 
positive effect on the firm value, which means that 
if the ownership structure is more concentrated 
then the value of the firm is higher. The second 
objective of the research is to examine whether the 
interaction between concentrated and analytical 
ownership had a positive effect on firm value. 
Although a firm has concentrated ownership but if 
the analyst continues to analyze the company, it 
will have a positive impact on the value of the firm 
because it gives more confidence to the investors 
in the decision making. The results of empirical 
testing prove that the interaction between concen-
trated ownership with analyst following does not 
affect the firm value. H2 testing results are not 
supported by the argument Lang et al. (2004) that 
states that analysts are less interested in firms with 
poor firm-level corporate governance, such as con-
centrated ownership. 
The third objective of this research is to find 
out whether the protection of investors in the 
domicile country of the firms affect the firm value. 
The testing results provide empirical evidence that 
the firms domiciled in countries with low investor 
protection, tend to have a concentrated ownership 
structure. Although this research does not test 
cost-monitoring, it may be possible to establish 
monitoring by an efficient blockholder called cost 
efficiency of monitoring and therefore it can 
increase the value of the firm like the argument La 
Porta et al. (1998). 
Additional testing were conducted to exa-
mine the effect of concentrated ownership on the 
firm value in terms of alignment and entrench-
ment effect. The testing results provide empirical 
evidence that if the concentrated ownership of up 
to 20% affects the value of the firm is not signi-
ficant. Alignment effect tends to occur in stock 
ownership of more than 20% to 65%. The effect 
of stock ownership is concentrated on the firm 
value if share ownership is more than 65% then 
the firm value will decrease. Entrenchment effect 
tends to occur if concentrated ownership is greater 
than 65%. Fama and Jensen (1983) state that if 
managerial ownership reaches more than 50%, 
then there is full supervision and shareholders 
tend to take actions that benefit their own 
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interests. The testing results are consistent with the 
testing results conducted by Morck et al. (1988). 
This research has some limitations regarding 
the use of research variables. The first limitation 
of this research is the measurement of investor 
protection variables that use the value of the 
World Economic Forum that will have the same 
investor protection score for each firm in the same 
country since the investor protection is a country-
level variable. Further research can measure the 
investor protection by using four dimensions, 
which is proxied with the disclosure requirement 
(DR), standard liability (LS), anti director right 
(ADR), and public enforcement (PE) that are pro-
posed by LaPorta et al. (1998, 2006). 
The second limitation of this research is the 
measurement of corporate governance variables 
that are only proxied with the variable of concen-
trated ownership structure. Further research can 
use other corporate governance dimensions such 
as the Corporate Governance Index based on 
Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CSLA) (Klapper 
and Love, 2004). The third limitation is related to 
the measurement of analyst following variables. 
The available database are limited and therefore 
the measurement of analyst following variables has 
not been presented better. Therefore, the further 
research is recommended to be able to use a 
more complete database presenting data analyst 
following such as I / B / E / S. 
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